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The United States is generally understood to be a capitalist, industrial 
offshoot of Europe, whose culture has been transformed by contact with 
Native-American, African, and Asian cultures. It is currently unfashion- 
able to assert the existence of a common American cultural experience. I 
want to confront head-on the question of national character and its 
relationship to technology. Americans long believed that both their 
machines and the way they used them made them unique, and it is 
emphatically not my aim to revive these claims. However, in rejecting the 
idea of an American exceptionalism based on a uniquely democratic 
technology, one need not dispense with the idea of divergent national 
patterns that are expressed in both behavior and material culture.' 
The United States, as a newly emerging nation in the nineteenth century, 
sought to shape a separate identity for itself. This story is best known in a 
literary form, as the struggle of antebellum American writers to free 
1 For comments on this paper I am indebted to members of the Danish American Studies Consortium who 
participated in a two day P11.D. seminar in October, 1995. 
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themselves from English dominance and create a distinctive national 
literature. Less remembered is the effort lo industrialize without repeat- 
ing the errors of European nations, which had created polluted industrial 
areas and a miserable proletariat that shocked early American travelers, 
particularly in England. While many nations have taken pride in 
particular technical achievements, Americans saw themselves as an 
ingenious people, a nation of tinkerers and inventors who would 
industrialize without creating either a proletariat or unhealthy industrial 
cities. This self-perception has largely disappeared today, as part of a 
general renunciation of the idea of American exceptionalism, the once 
popular idea that the history and development of the United States is 
fundamentally different from that of Europe. 
To see how matters now stand, consider a lead essay of the fall 1992 
issue of The Journal ofAmerican History written by the then President of 
the Organization of American Historians, Joyce Appleby. Her title, 
"Recovering America's Historic Diversity: Beyond E~ceptionalism,"~ 
underlines how for many Americanists the idea of "exceptionalism" now 
posits an unacceptably radical difference between the United States and 
the rest of the world. Appleby deftly traces some of the ideological 
underpinnings to "exceptionalism", showing how a good deal of eight- 
eenth-century American history had to be suppressed from view in order 
to make the nation seem fundamentally different from Europe. Techno- 
logy, which was once a central part of the exceptionalist argument, is not 
mentioned at any point in her argument. 
This is a remarkable omi~sion.~ During most of the nineteenth century 
and a good deal of the twentieth, the national character was thought to be 
exemplified by a pantheon of inventors, including Eli Whitney, Robert 
Fulton, Alexander Graham Bell, Thomas Edison, Henry Ford, and the 
Wright Brothers, to name but a few. The argument has recently been 
relaunched by Newt Gingrich in To Renew America, which celebrates 
individualism, "the spirit of free enterprise" and "the spirit of invention 
2 Joyce Appleby, "Recovering America's Historic Diversity: Beyond Exceptionalism," Jourrzal of 
American History 79:2, Sept. 1992, pp. 419-432. 
3 Appelby is not idiosyncratic in omitting the history of technology. In a debate over historical method that 
pitied the "old history" verws the "new" Gertrude Himinelfarb also ignored the history of technology. "Some 
Refleclions on the New History," American Historical Review 94, no. 3 (1989): 661-670. 
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and discovery." Gingrich declares "We have no caste system, no class 
requirements, no regulated professions, no barriers to entry." He rejects 
the idea that "America is no different than E ~ r o p e . " ~  This is an nineteenth 
century argument, which in its classic form claimed that Americans were 
ingenious Yankees who focused on practical results. They were less 
interested in science than engineering, less concerned with aristocratic 
theory than with the democratic dispersal of useful improvements. 
Compared to Europeans, Americans were unfettered by guilds, state 
monopolies, and other artificial restraints on trade.5 The nation industrial- 
ized rapidly after c. 1825, and if in the beginning it necessarily imitated 
European machinery, there were soon claims for an American style in 
machine building, in manufacturing, and in business organization. I will 
take up these three topics in turn, moving from individual machines to 
their organization in factories and then to how these factories were 
managed. After this focus on production, I will then briefly turn to the 
American popular reception of technology. In all four areas some 
differences between Americans and Europeans can be documented. Do 
these differences collectively merit the "exceptionalist" label? 
Are American machines different from those made in some or all of the 
European countries? John Kowenhoven argued in his once influential 
Made in America that there was a distinctive American machine design, 
exemplified in such artefacts as the American ax, the clipper ship, the 
loosely jointed American locomotive, and the Model T. Ford. All were 
characterized by simplicity, plainness, efficiency, and a functional 
aestheticG Furthermore, Americans early began to build machines 
designed to last only a short time. This practice, often criticized by 
4 Newt Gingrich, To Relzevv Anzerica. New Yo*: HarperCollins, 1994, pp. 41-43. Gingrich goes on to 
name, on the same page, Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Edison, Ford. He later mentions the older pantheon of Fnlton, 
Whitney, Morse, and the Wright Brothers, p. 44. 
5 Of course there was also a counter-tradition, emphasizing the natural landscape (andior the frontier) as the 
seedbed of national identity. Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton argued over how much the nation 
should industrialize, and had Jefferson's policies prevailed the nation might have been more agrarian, 
importing many of the finished goods it needed from Europe. Jefferson was not as rabidly anti-technological 
as many once thought, however. See John Kasson, Civilizirzg tlze Maclziize. Penguin. 1977, pp. 36-38. 
6 John Kowenhoven, Made in Anzerica: Tlze Arts in Modern Civilizatio~z. New York: Doubleday, 1962, pp. 
26-33, passim 
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Europeans, emphasized immediate practical results, and assumed that 
machines would be replaced frequently. Where the English built loco- 
motives to last indefinitely, Americans expected better ones to be invent- 
ed before long. Likewise, where Europeans early demanded efficiency 
from stationary steam engines, Americans at first preferred cheapness 
and simplicity in operation, and willingly used more fuel. Oliver Evans 
invented just such a device, a new kind of steam engine which ran at high 
pressure and quickly became standard on American steamboats. "It was 
smaller, cheaper, and less complex," but it had one serious drawback: it 
exploded e a ~ i l y . ~  In short, one might make a case for American machines 
as being distinctively pragmatic, temporary, and functional. 
Yet a powerful counter-argument has been in the ascendancy in recent 
years. Studies in the history of technology have emphasized the exchange 
of technical information through international networks. For example, 
the American iron industry was started by English and German immig- 
rants in the colonial period. Major nineteenth century advances such as 
Bessemer steel and later the open-hearth process were developed in 
Europe and transfered to the United States.* Likewise, canal construction, 
almost unknown in the new United States of the 1790s, was attempted at 
first without much success, until aided by William Weston, an immigrant 
engineer who had worked under the great English canal-builder, James 
Brindley. From Weston, men in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsyl- 
vania learned surveying, a canal's proper dimensions, the superiority of 
stone to brick (and of brick to wood) in constructing walls, the design of 
locks, and the necessity of puddling, or laminating the walls of the canal 
repeatedly with a clay paste, to make them water-tight.9 Similarly, the 
indispensible ingredient in creating an Ameican textile industry was the 
largely non-verbal knowledge of design brought across the Atlantic by 
7 Brooke Hindle, Emulation and Invention. Smithsonian Institution: Washington, D.C., 1981, p. 55.  
8 An American named William Kelly had independently hit upon something like the Bessemer process, and 
he was granted a patent. But his discovery was not fully translated into a method and set of equipment, and 
American steel makers had to buy licenses from both Kelly and Bessemer. For an excellent account of the in- 
troduction of the Bessemer process into the United States, see Elting E. Morison, Men, Maclzirzes, and Modern 
Tiiizes. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966, pp. 123-205. For a brief account of the iron industry, see W. David 
Lewis, Iieo~orz and Steel irz America Greenville, Delaware: The Hagley Museum, 1976. 
9 Elting Morrison, From KnowHow to Nowlzem: The Developnzerzt ofArizericalz Teclzizo1og)i. New York: 
Basic Boolts, 1974, pp. 22-30. 
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immigrant textile machine builders.I0 Likewise, French immigrant, 
Eleuthkre Ir6n6e du Pont transfered superior techniques of gunpowder 
manufacturing to the United States, establishing an extensive wolks on 
the Brandywine." Americaiis already manufactured gunpowder, but 01 
uneven quality. Du Pont had superior techniques, learned in years of 
training in the French government's industry. Using his contacts he 
imported a complete set of equipment "essential to every phase of black 
powder manufacture" and kept abreast of French developments in the 
trade after he had built his American factory.I2 Even Fulton's famous 
steamboat used a steam-engine made in England, and he engaged "at 
least one mechanic who had worked for Boulton and Watt to cross the 
Atlantic and set up tlie engine."13 
The carriers of information were often immigrants, but there were also 
more formal channels. Technical publications and magazines, world's 
fairs, congresses, and official visits all sped the flow of innovations, so 
that even a small factory along the Appalachian fall line, such as tlie one 
that Anthony Wallace studied in Rockdale, kept abreast of the latest 
innovations. He found that in the textile industry "nearly all of tlie several 
hundred master mechanicians of the English-speaking world knew each 
other by name and reputation," and "each man probably had met with and 
talked with most of his peers on one occasion or another or had 
corresponded in writing."14 I n  short, the weight of evidence about Amer- 
ican machine-making seems to go against the "exceptionalist" hypo- 
thesis, although there are cases that point the other way. Clearly Amer- 
icans were alert to the newest European ideas and innovations, which 
they combined with their own. 
Yet if their machines must be seen as part of a trans-Atlantic dialogue, 
did Americans nevertheless manufacture in a distinctive fashion? 
10 David J. Jeremy, "Innovation in Ame
r
ican Texlile Teclmology during the early 19th Century," 
Teclznology and Cnllure 14 (January, 1973): pp. 41-45. 
11 Darwin Stapleton, The Transfer ofEarly Teclznologies to Anzericn. Philadelphia: American Philosophical 
Society, 1987, pp. 72-12] ,  
12 Ibid., pp. 88, 114,passinz. 
13 Hiiidle, p. 53.  
14Aiitl1011y E C. Wallace. Roclcrlnle. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978, p. 219. 
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At the Crystal Palace exhibition of 1851, European observers found some 
American machines on view unlike their own. Yet they did not speak at 
once of an "American system of manufacturing." This idea was invented 
in the early twentieth century and until recently remained unquestioned. 
Kouwenhoven argued that "the technology of mass production is as 
indigenous to the United States as the husking bee," and saw automation, 
interchangeable parts, and the assembly line as national characteristics.15 
Many historians heralded mass production as a defining national hall- 
mark. Two characteristic heroes in this account were Eli Whitney and 
Henry Ford.lG From the moment that Whitney displayed ten muslcets with 
interchangeable parts to President-elect Thomas Jefferson in 1801, he 
was credited with creating a uniquely American approach to production. 
Machines would make identical parts for other machines. Historians have 
found, however, that Whitney did not mass-produce interchangeable 
components for muslcets in 1801; they remained an idea more than a 
reality for many years.17 Furthermore, the idea of interchangability itself 
was first dreamed in France, during the eighteenth century, by General 
Jean-Baptiste de Gribeauval. Whitney's workmen made reasonably 
standardized parts, to be sure, but they did so by hand-filing what came 
out of the moulds. An astute self-publicist, Whitney emphasized the 
possible results of his system and made it the ideal toward which many 
manufacturers strove. Yet the "American system" was not as well- 
defined or as self-conscious in 1851 as historians once claimed, and a 
British Parliamentary committee found that even in 1854 Samuel Colt 
had not yet managed the precision necessary to make identical parts. 
Rather, they were "very nearly alike."18 
15 Konwenhoven, op. cit., p. 40. 
16 Other figures who uwally appeared in these naktives 'were Elias Howe (sewing machine), Oliver 
Evans (antomated flour mill), Robert Fulton (steamboat), Samuel Morse (telegraph), Alexander Graham Bell 
(telephone), The Wright Brothers (the airplane), and Thomas A. Edison (phonograph, electric lighting 
system), plns many more. For a deconstructivist account of how the mythology of the inventor was inscribed 
on the documents of Tholnas Edison, see David E. Nye, The Iizveizted Selp A7z Anti-Biogqdzy of'Tlzonzas A. 
Eclisoiz . Odense: Odense University Press, 1983. 
17 Merritt Row Smith, "Eli Whitney and the American System of Manufacturing" in Caroll W. Pnrsell, Jr. 
Teclzizology in America. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981, pp. 45-61. 
18 David A. Hounshell, From the Ainericniz System to Mass Productioiz, 1800-1932. Baltimore: Jollns 
Hopkins University Press, 1984, pp. 25-29. 
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Even if the term "American system" was not used and interchange- 
ability itself was more a goal than an achievement, many first-hand 
witnesses found American production methods distinctive. An English 
workingman who came to the United States d~lring the Civil War found 
that "there are few trades which have not been materially changed" after 
they crossed the Atlantic. He emphasized that "division of labour is 
carried out in all the various branches of skilled labour to the fullest 
possible extent; this system not only facilitates production, but it 
conduces to perfection in the workmen; machinery, too, is used for every 
purpose to which it can be applied."I9 This was a difference less in 
technology than in its organization, turning the focus to management, 
which pursued interchangeability most vigorously in the United States. 
Half a century later, the end result of this process was the assembly line 
perfected by Henry Ford at his Highland Park Plant in 1912. Because of 
standardization, Whitney's factory required fewer skilled workmen than 
any previous armory, but Ford went much further. He not only used 
interchangeable parts, but also sub-divided work more thoroughly than 
anyone before, and beca~lse his semi-skilled workmen could learn their 
tasks in a matter of days they became largely interchangeable as well. 
Mass production has many forms, however, and while Ford led the 
world automotive sector for at least a decade, transforming the nature of 
capital-intensive industry in the process, Americans did not lead in all 
areas. If one looks closely at a mature industry such as textile 
manufacturing in the early twentieth century, at precisely the time that 
Ford was in the ascendancy, American facilities lagged behind much of 
continental Europe. A comparative study of the textile industry by a 
German expert, Wilhelm Stiel, revealed that in the 1920s considerable 
differences existed among the textile-producing countries. England 
lagged the farthest behind, as they "rested on old tradition ... supported 
by the fact that a successful spinning industry has grown up on the basis 
of substantially built mills with well-designed and smoothly running line 
shafting." Exhaustive efficiency tests showed that, compared to this 
overhead shafting, group drive [one electric motor to a small number of 
19 J. D. Burn, The Years Among the Woldcing-Classes of the United States During the Wnu. London: Smith, 
Elder and Co., 1865, p. 178. 
134 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 29, 1997 
machines] was better and individual drive [one motor to one machine] 
was best. Nevertheless, the English retained the line-shaft mill driven by 
a few large electric motors. In contrast, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, 
and Sweden converted most of their textile factories to individual electric 
drive, and as a result had higher productivity, because their machines ran 
at faster and more constant speeds. American manufacturers were in an 
intermediate stage of development. They early adopted group drive, most 
typically with one motor mounted on the ceiling to drive four machines' 
by belt. Stiel commented that their practices were "founded on the 
American principle, viz. utmost economy of man-power (production per 
head and not per machine!) to which a bit of spindle speed is willingly 
sacrificed, so that American working speeds cannot bear comparison 
with those in use in Europe."20 This analysis of one industry is highly 
suggestive for others. Stiel had noted an American propensity to keep 
wages as low as possible, which was possible in a largely non-union 
country. Lower wages made it unnecessary to maximize capital invest- 
ment in machinery. In other words, Stiel found America distinctive for 
reasons that were not technological, but social. 
The conclusion that United States' industries varied considerably also 
emerges if one examines the way that workers were paid. Work by piece- 
rate in the twentieth century enjoyed a revival in labor-intensive 
industries, such as the shops of the General Electric and Westinghouse. In 
contrast, the heavily-capitalized assembly line encouraged manufacturers 
to adopt fixed hourly wages, beca~~se workers had no choice but to keep 
up the pace. More highly skilled work increasingly was done on the basis 
of daily quotas, with incentives for overprod~ction.~~ In short, there was 
not a single "American system" of manufacturing in the early twentieth 
century, by which time the production system certainly had matured. 
Rather, there were at least three systems in place. Older industries, such 
as textiles, kept wages low and modernized equipment with that factor in 
mind. Newer mass-production industries, epitomized by Ford, developed 
a high wage policy, for which they demanded fast-paced routine work on 
20 Wilhelm Stiel, Textile Electrificatiorz. London: George Roulledge & Sons, 1933, pp. 150-151. Note that 
these comparisons are all between highly developed indust
r
ial economies. 
21 Ronald Schatz, The Electrical Worlcers: A Histoq of Labor at Gerzeral Electric nizd Westirzglzouse, 1923- 
1960. UIbana: University of Illinois, 1983, p. 138. 
assembly lines. Highly-skilled work developed in yet a third direction, as 
companies adopted piece-rates and individual incentives. In short, there 
was no monolithic "Fordist" system of production, contrary to what 
many humanists all too casually assume. Rather, the characteristic 
American factor was the weakness of organized labor, so that the work- 
force had to respond to the quite different strategies of large corporations, 
depending upon whether they were capital or labor intensive, skilled or 
unsltilled. The labor marltet, more than technology, made America 
distinctive when compared to Europe, where unions were strong and 
corporations few. Note that while these comparisons are all between 
highly developed industrial economies they are further confirmed by 
looking at labor in developing economies. In the early twentieth century 
newly industrializing countries such as China and India, even when they 
purchased up-to-date machinery, were unable to produce as efficiently as 
England or America because their labor force was not yet sufficiently 
s l ~ l l e d . ~ ~  Culture is often a more important factor than technology in 
fostering or limiting economic growth. 
While exceptionalism based on American machine design or a distinctive 
system of manufacturing are implausible, Alfred D. Chandler has 
advanced a theory of business organization based in part on American 
uniqueness. He argues that in the United States the private corporation 
developed a distinctive form in response to the sheer size of the 
continental marltet served by railroads and canals. Unlike the frag- 
mented, small, and protected European markets of the nineteenth century, 
which encouraged small-scale production, American businessmen faced 
a market that was unified, large, and highly competitive. These condi- 
tions encouraged both economies of production and large organizations. 
In response, Americans early began to move away from partnerships and 
family firms toward corporations. In the process they developed new 
forms of accounting, production, and marketing. Most important of all, 
they invented a new form of the corporation, which no longer was created 
by a special act of the legislature, but rather could be formed by any 
22 See Gregory Clark, "Why Isn't the Whole World Developed? Lessons £01 Ihe Cotton Mills," Journal of 
Ecoizonzic History. vol. XLVII, no. 1, March 1987, pp. 141-173. 
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group of people who wished to limit their personal liability to the amount 
they invested in a new firm. 
In contrast, when partnerships and family firms went banluupt, the 
investors could lose all their capital. Such companies, which need to be 
more ca~~tious in management and which have more difficulty raising 
large sums, were still the norm in most of Europe until World War 11. 
They grew to a large scale less frequently, first because they operated in 
small markets, and second because they depended on a family or small 
group to be talented, united, and well-capitalized over extended periods. 
Thus it was the United States, not Europe which emerged at the end of 
the nineteenth century as the premier site of the corporation. Nor did this 
result from blind economic forces at worlt. Chandler attacks the 
traditional laissez-faire notion of the "invisible hand of the inarltet," 
arguing instead that it was the visible hand of management that shaped 
American corporations, which he regards as the dominant institution in 
the life of the United States.23 
Yet while Chandler may at first appear to be an exponent of American 
exceptionalism, his subsequent worlt reveals an interest in how 
corporations developed outside the United States. German development 
was directed more by banks than in the United States. British firms 
resisted incorporation and tended to remain family-run or partnerships 
down to World War 11. Japanese trading companies developed into 
manufacturing firms in close cooperation with the g~vernrnent .~~ In short, 
Chandler's work can in fairness only be used to make an argument for 
American exceptionalism if one is also prepared to argue for a degree of 
"exceptionalism" in other nations as well. Chandler's work ultimately 
only makes a case for a certain soft determinism. In his scenario large, 
private, diversified, corporations catering to a mass market have a 
decisive competitive advantage over businesses that are small, that are 
public, that produce only one thing or a small number of things, and that 
cater to smaller markets. In other words, if the original idea of an 
"exception" is that there is a "rule" followed elsewhere, then Chandler 
grants American business exceptional status only in that its managers 
23 Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand. Cainbridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. 
24 Alfred D. Chandler, "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American Industry." I11 Richard Tedlow and 
Richard John, eds. Managing Big B~lsiness. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986. 
grasped the key factors of corporate development sooner than others and 
in that Americans have chosen to institutionalize these factors somewhat 
differently than Germany, England or Japan. Such a theory does not 
really grant America an exceptional status, but rather argues for certain 
ground rules of capitalist development that permit a range of cultural 
variation. 
Economic geographers Michael Storper and Richard Walker corrobor- 
ate this general approach, while developing their own typology. They 
identify four distinctive patterns of capitalist development. That in the 
United States has been characterized by high wage levels, high worker 
consumption, moderate profits, and moderate investment. An Asian 
model, exemplified by Japan, sets more modest levels for wages and 
consumption, with higher rates of profit and investment. The Brazilian 
economy represents yet another path, with low wages, permitting high 
investment levels and many exports but weak domestic consumption and 
erratic overall performance. Finally, the British system is characterized 
by modest wages, moderate mass consumption, low profits, and weak 
inve~tment .~~ As these comparisons suggest, capitalism is not one system, 
but rather a variety of culturally inflected developments. Energy use is an 
important part of each of these forms of capitalism, and not surprisingly, 
the United States, with its emphasis on high rates of consumption, uses 
more energy per capita than any other nation. 
If one looks at the first three sections of this chapter together, rather 
than separately, Chandler's theory does not contradict either the notion 
that American machines were built for maximum short-term efficiency or 
the idea that Americans pioneered mass production within an interna- 
tional context of technology and information exchange. Indeed, Chandler 
allows us to replace the rather woolly and undefined idea of "national 
character" as the driving force at work, with the far more specific idea 
that managers selected machines and organized factories in a distinctive 
American way because they catered to and competed in the world's first 
mass market. In other words, it was not that Americans lacked the 
traditional monopolies and government restrictions of Europe, a negative 
25 Michael Storper and Richard Wallter, The Cnpitnlist Inzperative: Territory, Teclznology, and Irzd~~strinl 
G~*o~vtlz. Oxford, Blaclwell, 1989. 
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argument that focuses on an absent obstacle that did not stand in the 
way of vaguely-defined actors. Rather, American managers faced the 
demands of a large market which offered competitive advantages to those 
who could produce and sell on a large scale. This is a positive argument 
that focuses on incentives to clearly-defined historical actors. However, 
such an argument leaves most Americans out of the discussion, as it 
focuses on the management elite. What of the "mass" in the "mass 
market?" 
The French traveller Michael Chevalier noted in the 1830s that, "There is 
a perfect mania in this country on the subject of  railroad^."^^ This 
enthusiasm co~lld be seen among virtually all citizens. For example, in 
Baltimore the entire city turned out to celebrate the construction of the 
nation's first railway line. That they held this celebration on Independ- 
ence Day in 1828 suggests how technology early intertwined with 
American nationalism. The event went off without a dissenting voice, 
with a huge parade in which most of the artisans of the city participated. 
In contrast, two years later when the Liverpool and Manchester Railway 
opened, it drew a much larger crowd estimated at 400,000, which lined 
the tracks for most of the distance. If Baltimore's citizens had eagerly 
gathered to celebrate technological advance, many in the English crowd 
protested the new railway. Some spattered mud on the clothes of the 
ladies and gentlemen who were the first passengers. On a prominent spot 
above the crowd, a poorly dressed hand-loom weaver sat as a silent 
protest, understood by Fanny Kemble to be "a representative man, to 
protest against this triumph of machinery, and the gain and glory which 
the wealthy Liverpool and Manchester men were likely to derive from 
itwz7 The English, more than the Americans, viewed industrialization in 
terms of class exploitation, satanic mills and frankensteinian monsters. 
Americans have long embraced new technologies with far less criti- 
cism than Europeans. A particularly strihng example was the American 
26 Michael Chevalier, Society, Mc~izizers, and Politics i7z the United States. New Yorlr: Doubleday, 1961, pp. 
71, 73-74. For more on the tendency of Americans to see their railroads in nationalistic terms, see James A. 
Wad, Railroads and tlze Clznrncter ofAmerica, 1820-1887. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986. 
27 Cited Francis Klingender, Art mzd the I~zdustrial Revolution. Ed., Arthur Elton. New Yorlc: Augustus M. 
Kelley, 1968, p. 147. 
enthusiasm for spectacular electrical displays, first at expositions in the 
1880s and 1890s and later in the commercial zones of American cities. 
Where English and French communities successfully legislated against 
enormous electrical signs, only a minority of Americans opposed them, 
almost entirely without success. Times Square and the Great White Way 
became the models that other American cities imitated when they strove 
to be glamorous and modern.2x Nor was extensive lighting merely a ploy 
on the part of businessmen. They spent millions of dollars on electrical 
displays because the public demanded it, and patronized the areas of the 
city that were most brilliantly (Europeans would say garishly) illumin- 
ated. Spectacular lighting displays still remain popular in the United 
States today, as, for example, in the extensive use of laser beams in the 
ceremony rededicating the Statue of Liberty in 1986.29 Perhaps the 
clearest example of the difference between American and European 
views of technology is the popular response to the two space programs. 
Where hundreds of thousands, and on some occasions millions, of Amer- 
icans turn out to see a launching, Europeans display little enthusiasm for 
their space program. Launchings have never inspired a great deal of 
European newspaper or television coverage, and almost no one would 
consider using vacation time and money to travel to French Guinea to see 
a rocket go up. Americans have long enjoyed technological display more 
than Europeans, and these displays have often been understood in terms 
of a nationalism that borders on the claims of exceptionalism. As one 
women at a Cape Kennedy launch put it succinctly, "There isn't another 
country in the world that's going to do this - you've got to say America's 
first."30 
Just as Appleby made no reference to technology, so too today's 
technological historians seldom refer to "exceptionalism." The once 
acceptable ideas that American machines and manufacturing methods 
were f~mdamentally distinctive have given way to discussion of interna- 
tional networks of information exchange, flowing through immigration, 
trade journals, world's fairs, joint work on engineering projects, and 
28 See David E. Nye, Electr~irzg Anzerica; Social Memilzgs of n New Technology. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1990, chapter two, "The Great White Way." 
29 I devote a chapter to this event in Americwr Tecim~logicnl Shblinze, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994. 
30 New York Times, April 13, 1981. 
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other kinds of technological transfer. While American mills and factories 
had distinctive features, they were clearly related to European facilities, 
sometimes ahead of them, at times not. In short, when emphasizing 
technology alone, exceptionalism proves to be a lame horse, if not a dead 
one. But if one loolts instead at business organization and the popular 
reception of technology, the United States appears distinct from Europe. 
The social construction of technology in America, whether examined in 
terms of institutional arrangements or in terms of the formation of 
popular consciousness, suggests a national pattern. 
Why does Appleby prefer to omit American technological history from 
her account, if recent research in the field does not leiid support to the 
exceptionalist thesis? She notes that "Remembering and forgetting deter- 
mine the history we tell." Appleby also attacks the penchant Americans 
have had for erasing much of the past, in order to create the clean slate of 
an exceptionalist nation, "born free" on "virgin land."31 But in her brief 
for multicultural history, she has erased areas of the past as well. In her 
account, rather significant areas are simply wiped out, including 
business, technology, invention, and science. Furthermore, theories of 
m~dticulturalism, such as Appleby's, seem to require the suppression of 
observed commonalities in the United States. Indeed, the multicultural 
approach has the very faults that are usually attributed to "exceptional- 
ism" itself. Each ethnic, racial, and gender minority claims to be radically 
different from every other. In this "essentialism," each group claims to 
have a cultural essence that is in danger of being polluted or destroyed by 
the larger society. The history of technology thus has not only been 
associated with the exceptionalist thesis, it is widely understood as a 
central part of the hegemonic culture that multiculturalism opposes. It is 
the unspoken absence at the heart of many multicultural texts. There is 
considerable irony in the situation. Many have cast aside "American 
exceptionalism" only to embrace instead a "multi-exceptionalism" in 
which America is rewritten as a nation of heterogeneous groups, each of 
which can only be interpreted by cultural insiders. 
Such an approach focuses on details and overlooks the larger 
structures of American culture. For example, Americans may crave a 
31 Appleby, pp. 427, 430. 
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variety of ethnic cuisines, but increasingly these are processed foods 
cooked in a microwave or bought at a fast food restaurant. The specific 
food is distinctive, but the packaging, advertising, preparation, and the 
consumption time are commonalities. This may be seen, for example, at 
the immigration museum on Ellis Island, where a variety of ethnic fast- 
foods are available, each being sold and consumed in the same way. Is 
this multi-ethnicity? 
Many other similarities exist among Americans, but those embracing 
multiculturalism spend little time looking for shared characteristics or 
shared technical systems.32 There is a common core to American culture 
which makes it distinctive and identifiable, although not exceptional, and 
the social construction of technology reveals part of that common core. 
There are many characteristic American patterns, including wasteful 
consumption habits, the world's highest energy use, heavy reliance on 
processed foods, longer work hours and less vacation time than in 
European countries, the sprawling layout of cities and suburbs, the 
general rejection of mass transit, and so forth. Those living in the United 
States seem blind to such commonalities, but they immediately strike any 
outside observer. 
For more than a decade Americans have been over-emphasizing their 
differences, and there is not a little irony in this development. At the very 
moment when interchangeability, mass production, television, and the 
computer have fully penetrated not only production but also the spheres 
of consumption and cultural reproduction, at the very moment when 
virtually all Americans are enmeshed in advanced technological systems 
that bind them together, they have chosen to ignore their material 
connectedness and to insist on the primacy of inherited or newly redis- 
covered cultural values. The very elimination of technology from 
Appleby's text and from most discussions of m~~lticulturalism signifies a 
reluctance to confront the structures that have penetrated thoroughly into 
every aspect of daily life. Meanwhile, Newt Gingrich and the Republican 
Party win elections by championing individualism, free enterprise and 
32 The crowd at a mass sporting event or at the launching of a space shuttle comes from all segments of the 
population. See chapter nine in David E. Nye, Anzericaiz Teclznologicnl Sublime. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1994. 
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exceptionalism, in combination with a nineteenth-century vision of 
liberating technology. 
In contrast, historians of technology question both the idea that 
American machines and manufacturing systems are hallmarlts of national 
identity and the Whig idea of history as the story of amelioration. 
Questioning the idea of a national character and the idea of progress leads 
one to focus on the cultural meaning of technological systems them- 
selves. Do different ethnic and racial groups work on assembly lines in 
fundamentally distinctive ways? Do they drive automobiles on different 
kinds of roads and follow different traffic rules? Do they plug their 
electrical appliances into different grids? Do they use different credit 
cards or use them in fundamentally different ways? Do some of them 
reject items made with interchangeable parts in favor of hand-made 
items? By such tests, only a few groups really merit the name "multi- 
cultural," including the Amish, many Native-Americans, some of the 
rural poor, and some of those living in communes. Most Americans are 
inextricably bound LIP with their technological systems, which they use to 
shape their lives as producers and consumers within the world's most 
energy-intensive culture. Indeed, this quantitative difference in energy 
use is so large that it translates into important qualitative distinctions 
between the United States and other nations. The American organization 
of production and consumption displays a discernible pattern, whose 
lineaments can be traced through history, and whose existence undercuts 
the more extreme claims for multiculturalism. 
Americans of different ethnic and racial backgrounds usually resemble 
each other more than they do people from their nations of origin. Their 
similarities emerge in habits of energy use, which include the electrified 
home, automobile, and air-conditioner, and which touch virtually all 
aspects of life, including even those that seem most distinctive. For 
example, production and consumption of food is a central part of 
maintaining a cultural tradition. In the United States, food requires 17% 
of all the energy used, with 6% for production, another 6% for process- 
ing, and 5% for transport, refrigeration, cooking, and washing dishes. 
Ethnic differentiation in cuisine thus exists within an energy-intensive 
framework. By the 1980s a typical large s~~permarket stocked an average 
of 30,000 items. The price of achieving this variety was a decline in the 
total number of markets in the 1980s, while the average floor space of the 
remaining stores doubled. The ethnic variety on the shelves is based on 
capitalist rationalization, packaging, and distribution. At the superinaket 
multiculturalism and advanced capitalism prove compatible, just as they 
do in merchandizing by mail, in narrow-casting in the broadcast media, 
and in other forms of market segmentation. 
Furthermore, whatever the preferred cuisine, Americans of all ethnic 
and racial backgrounds tend toward high sugar and high fat diets that lead 
to the "diseases of affluence." Finally, much of the variety of ethnic 
cuisine is maintained as a business: "55 percent of America's consumer 
food budget is spent on restaurant meals and ready-to-eat convenience 
foods."33 This is a far higher percentage than in most other cultures, and 
further indicates how market forces maintain a veneer of ethnic diversity. 
The businesses of transportation, food preservation, marketing, and 
advertising prove central to the creation of a surface appearance of 
variety, in stark contrast to the small grocer of c. 1920 who bought from 
local farmers and regional suppliers. 
Virtually every foreign observer from Tocqueville to Weber to our own 
time has noted the centrality of business in American culture, a fact 
perhaps so obvious that those living inside the United States tend to 
overlook it. As the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga noted a lifetime ago 
in Life and Thought in Anzerica, "The progress of technology compels the 
economic process to move toward concentration and general uniformity 
at an ever faster tempo. The more human inventiveness and exact science 
become locked into the organization of business, the more the active 
man, as the embodiment of an enterprise and its master, seems to 
disappear." By extension the distinctiveness of whole groups of immig- 
rants and minorities was eroded both by immersion in corporate work 
cultures and by the all pervasive character of American consumption. 
Note that, as in Chandler's argument, this is not a brief for technological 
determinism. Rather, Huizinga argued, like Tocqueville before him, that 
"The American wants to be like his neighbour," and he went one step 
further, expressing the power and importance of the idea of interchange- 
ability, noting that the American "only feels spiritually safe in what has 
33 Alan Dwning, How Much is Enouglz? The Co i~su ine~  Society and the Future of the Eai.tlz. New Yolrlc: 
Norton, 1992, pp. 69, 74, 68,45. 
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been ~tandardized."~~ If one doubts this statement consider the popularity 
of national merchandizing chains that guarantee a consumer the same 
products and services coast to coast. The uniformity in American life has 
become so great that a European, flying a thousand miles to a new city 
inside the United States, can frequently be disappointed, beca~lse the new 
place seems so much like all the other places. 
Multiculturalism is perhaps best understood as a reaction against the 
uniformities noted by Tocqueville, Weber, and Huizinga. It is an attempt, 
focused primarily within the realm of consumption, to counter the pres- 
sures toward standardization, efficiency, and business-directed routines 
in both the work place and private life. If advocates of multiculturalism 
such as Appleby ignore technology, it is not because they reject the 
almost forgotten exceptionalist history of American technology, but 
because they mistakenly (and implicitly) conceive of technology as a 
deterministic system. 
34 Johan Hnizinga, Life and Thought in America: A Dutch Historian's Vision, From Aj%r and Near: New 
Yorlc: Harper Torchboolcs, 1972, pp. 234,237. 
